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Abstract: The homogenization of products has caused e-commerce platform merchants to provide differentiated services to 
consumers through value-added services, in order to enhance the competitiveness of the market. Introduce the value-added 
service level factor in the e-commerce environment, consider the impact of e-commerce platform merchants providing 
value-added services on supply chain pricing, construct a secondary supply chain for manufacturers and e-commerce 
platform merchants, and compare and analyze centralized decision-making supply chains and dispersion decision-making 
supply chain pricing decisions. The simulation analysis shows that the increase of the value-added service level coefficient in 
a certain range has a positive stimulation effect on the product pricing of the e-commerce platform. Centralized 
decision-making supply chain and decentralized decision-making supply chain have a critical value for product pricing, and 
centralized decision-making supply chain is more sensitive to value-added services.The impact of the value-added service 
level on the overall profit of the centralized decision-making supply chain is less than the overall profit of the decentralized 
decision-making supply chain. 
 
Keywords: Pricing decisions, Value-added services, Centralized decision making, Decentralized decision making 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
With the increasingly fierce market competition and the shortened product life cycle 
[1]
, the sales model of 
enterprises has undergone major changes, and more and more enterprises tend to sell products through 
e-commerce platforms. Merchants of the e-commerce platform realized that in addition to the quality and price 
of the product itself, by providing differentiated value-added services, the utility of the consumer can be 
improved, thereby winning greater profits 
[2]
. The homogenization of various similar products is becoming more 
and more serious. Merchants increase market competitiveness through value-added services. More and more 
enterprises mean the importance of value-added services. For example, Jingdong Mall announced the launch of 
the “211” time-limited service in 2010. In the same year, Jingdong’s sales exceeded 10 billion, an increase of 
150% from 2009. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many businesses are aware of the importance of value-added services, but they don't know much about 
how value-added services affect consumers' choices and incentives. A large number of scholars study its impact 
on product pricing from the perspective of consumer behavior, sales channels, product performance. Cohen and 
Whang 
[3] 
constructed a product lifecycle model that examined the competition decision-making issues between 
manufacturers and independent service providers regarding after-sales service quality and price; Based on 
strategic consumer behavior between Nairp
 [4] 
and Levin
 [5]
, The dynamic pricing problem of retailers' products 
is studied from the perspectives of monopoly and competition. Du et al.
[6]
considering the strategic consumer risk 
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appetite and decreasing willingness to pay, studied and analyzed the price compensation strategy that can 
alleviate the consumer behavior of the strategy and the applicable conditions of this strategy. Liu et al. 
[7]
 and 
Prasad et al. 
[8] 
studied the dynamic pricing of differentiated products in the presence of strategic consumers. The 
former studies the multi-stage dynamic price competition of strategic consumers from the perspective of product 
vertical differentiation. The latter assumes that both strategic consumers and short-sighted consumers exist 
simultaneously. Based on two-stage dynamic pricing, two different pricing methods are studied. Manufacturers 
opening network direct sales channels will inevitably affect the profits of related retailers, resulting in channel 
conflicts and affecting retailers' order enthusiasm. Zhao Lianxia and Cheng Mingbao studied the pricing strategy 
of manufacturers not opening up direct marketing and open network direct sales channels when making profit 
sharing
[9]
. Liu Xinmin
 [10] 
and others proceeded from consumer satisfaction, considering consumers' 
heterogeneous preferences for green products, and constructing a three-way dynamic game model involving 
manufacturers, retailers and consumers. Analyze the impact of consumer sensitivity on price and greenness on 
consumer satisfaction and vendor pricing decisions.  
At present, most scholars are priced to influence the pricing decisions of products, and it is easy to ignore 
the influence of intangible factors on product pricing decisions. This paper introduces the value-added service 
level factor in the e-commerce environment, and considers the impact of e-commerce platform merchants 
providing value-added services on supply chain pricing. In summary, in the e-commerce environment, this paper 
constructs a secondary supply chain consisting of manufacturers and e-commerce platform merchants, and 
builds a demand function for the value-added service level of e-commerce platform merchants. Contrasting and 
analyzing the strategies of optimal pricing and value-added service levels of each entity under centralized 
decision-making and decentralized decision-making. 
 
3. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND PARAMETER ASSUMPTION  
Two-stage supply chain based on a manufacturer( M ) and an e-commerce platform merchant( R ). 
Typically, manufacturers provide goods to e-commerce platform merchants, while e-commerce platform 
merchants provide consumers goods with value-added services through e-commerce platforms. Merchants 
stimulate market demand by providing value-added services, which brings the cost of value-added 
services   2
1
2
C S s  [11].The product demand function [12,13,14] with value-added services can be represented by 
Q D P s    , and the product demand function without value-added services can be represented by 
Q D P  . Since the product pricing issue is considered in the text, there is no shortage of goods. Assuming 
information is Shared in the supply chain, e-commerce platform merchants and manufacturers are ideal 
individuals whose risk appetite is neutral [15].Because each individual in the supply chain is for profit, the unit 
cost per manufacturer for producing a commodity is c , and the e-commerce platform purchases the product at 
the wholesale price   and then sells it to the consumer at the price p . So there is p c  . The relevant 
parameter symbols are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Parameter description 
symbol meaning symbol meaning 
D  Basic consumer demand for products on 
e-commerce platforms 
1s  
Product value-added service level under centralized 
decision supply chain 
  Consumer sensitivity to price 
2s  
Product value-added service level under 
decentralized decision-making supply chain 
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  Consumer sensitivity to value-added services 
11  
The overall profit of the supply chain under the 
centralized decision of value-added services 
  E-commerce platform to increase the cost 
coefficient of value-added services 
12  
The overall profit of a centralized decision-making 
supply chain without value-added services 
11p  
Product pricing under a centralized 
decision-making supply chain with 
value-added services 
21  
The overall profit of a decentralized decision-making 
supply chain with value-added services 
12p  
Centralized decision-making supply chain 
product pricing without value-added services 
22  
The overall profit of a decentralized decision-making 
supply chain without value-added services 
21p  
Decentralized decision-making supply chain 
product pricing with value-added services 
12M
  
Profits of decentralized decision-making supply chain 
manufacturers with value-added services 
22p  
There is no value-added service decentralized 
decision-making supply chain product pricing 
22M
  
Decentralized decision-making supply chain 
manufacturer's profit without value-added services 
1  
Wholesale price of products under centralized 
decision supply chain 
12R
  
Profits of e-commerce platforms in providing 
value-added services under decentralized 
decision-making 
2  
Wholesale price of products under 
decentralized decision supply chain 
22R
  
Profits of e-commerce platforms without value-added 
services under decentralized decision-making 
 
4. CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING SUPPLY CHAIN E-COMMERCE PLATFORM 
MERCHANT PRICING STRATEGY  
In the centralized decision-making supply chain, manufacturers and e-commerce platform merchant are 
seen as a whole, and strive to maximize the profit of the supply chain. At this time, the biggest profit of the 
supply chain is to seek the maximum profit of the supply chain as a whole [16]. 
 
4.1 Centralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy with value-added services 
When e-commerce platform merchants provide value-added services, the overall profit function of the 
supply chain is        211 11 1 11 11 1 1
1
=
2
p c Q c s p c D P s s          . 
According to the backstepping method,the optimal pricing of the e-commerce platform merchants in the 
centralized decision-making supply chain is 
 2
11 22
D c
p
  
 

 


, and the optimal value-added service level is 
 
1 22
D c
s
 
 




. 
Substituting 
 2
11 22
D c
p
  
 

 


 and 
 
1 22
D c
s
 
 




 into 11 yields the optimal profit under the 
centralized decision-making supply chain: 
 
 
2
1 2
=
2 2
D c 

 


                                 （1） 
 
4.2 Centralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy without value-added services 
When the e-commerce platform merchant does not provide value-added services, the overall profit function 
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of the supply chain is     12 12 12 12= p c Q p c D P     . 
According to the backstepping method,The optimal pricing of products for e-commerce platform merchants 
in a centralized decision-making supply chain without value-added services is 12
+
2
c D
p


  . 
At this point, bring 12
2
c D
p


    into 12 , and get the optimal profit of the electronic platform merchant 
when there is no value-added service. 
 
2
12 =
4
D c




                                  （2） 
5. DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING SUPPLY CHAIN E-COMMERCE PLATFORM 
MERCHANT PRICING STRATEGY 
In the decentralized decision-making supply chain, manufacturers and e-commerce platform merchants are 
independent individuals, with the goal of maximizing their respective interests. In this case, manufacturers sell 
products to e-commerce platforms at wholesale prices 2  based on production costs, expected market demand 
and expected returns. At this point, e-commerce platform merchants conduct price analysis based on expected 
revenue and market demand and value-added service cost to determine whether the price is reasonable. If 
accepted, the agreement is reached; otherwise, the manufacturer re-quotes until the parties reach an agreement. 
 
5.1 Decentralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy with value-added services 
When an e-commerce platform merchant provides value-added services, the profit function of the 
e-commerce platform merchant is: 
      
1
2
2 21 2 2 21 2 21 2 2
1
=
2
R p Q c s p D P s s                      （4） 
According to the backstepping method, in decentralized decision-making supply chain, when the wholesale 
price is 2 , the optimal pricing for the product is
 22
21 22
D
p
   
 

 


, and the optimal value-added service 
level is
 2
2 22
D
s
 
 




. 
From this we can get 
 
 1
2
2
2 2
=
2 2
R
D 

 


. 
According to the agreement reached between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform merchants 
under the decentralized decision-making supply chain, the profit function of the manufacturer can be obtained 
when the e-commerce platform merchant provides value-added services: 
    
12 2 2 21 2
=M c Q c D P s                             （5） 
Substituting 
21p

 and 
2s

 into equation (4) gives the manufacturer the maximum profit: 
  
1
2 2
2 2
-
=
2
M
c D  

 


                            （6） 
The optimal profit of the supply chain under decentralized decision is: 
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 
 
     
 1 1
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
21 2 2 22 2
2
=
22 2 2 2
R M
D c D D D c         
  
    
     
   
 
      (7) 
 
5.2 Decentralized decision-making supply chain pricing strategy without value-added services 
When the e-commerce platform merchant does not provide value-added services, the profit function of the 
e-commerce platform merchant is:     
22 22 2 22 2 22
=R p Q p D P         
According to the backstepping method, In decentralized decision-making supply chain, e-commerce 
platform merchants do not provide value-added services. When the wholesale price is 2 , the optimal pricing 
of the e-commerce platform merchant for the product is 222
2
D
p
 

  . 
From this we can get 
 
2
2
2
2
4
R
D 




 . 
According to the agreement reached between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform merchants 
under the decentralized decision-making supply chain, the profit function of the manufacturer when the 
e-commerce platform merchant does not provide value-added services is: 
    
22 2 2 22M
c Q c D p                                 (8) 
Substituting 22p

 into 
22R
 gives the manufacturer the maximum profit: 
  
2
2 2
2
-
=
2
M
c D 


                               （9） 
The optimal profit of the supply chain under decentralized decision-making is: 
  
2 2
2 2
22 2 2
2
4
R M
D D c  
  

  
                   （10） 
 
6. CENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING AND DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING SUPPLY 
CHAIN SIMULATION ANALYSIS  
Assume that the basic market demand 200D   of a certain commodity of an e-commerce platform, the 
sensitivity coefficient of the sales price and the value-added service level are 10, 5   , The value-added 
service cost coefficient of e-commerce platform merchants is 10  . The manufacturer's unit cost of the 
product 5c  , the wholesale price 1=8 , 2 =9 . This is the case 
22 - =175 0  f , and Table 2 can be derived 
from this. 
Table 2.  Centralized decision-making supply chain and decentralized decision- 
making supply chain numerical calculation results 
mode p  s  Q   
Value-added service centralized decision-making supply chain 13.6 4.3 85.5 642.9 
Value-added service decentralized decision-making supply chain 15.2 3.1 63.5 628.6 
no value-added service centralized decision-making supply chain 12.5 —— 75 562.5 
no value-added service decentralized decision-making supply chain 14.5 —— 55 522.5 
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6.1 Analysis on the influence of value-added service level coefficient   
There is a critical value =   between the centralized decision-making supply chain and the 
decentralized decision-making supply chain for the pricing of e-commerce platform merchants. When  p , 
the optimal pricing of the e-commerce platform merchants in the decentralized decision-making supply chain is 
higher than the centralized decision-making supply chain; when  f , the e-commerce platform in the 
centralized decision-making supply chain is optimally priced for the product is higher than the decentralized 
decision-making supply chain, as shown in Figure 1. The increase of the value-added service level coefficient 
has a certain positive stimulation effect on the value-added service level of e-commerce platform products, and 
the centralized decision-making supply chain is more sensitive to the increase of the value-added service level 
coefficient, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1.  The impact of  on the pricing of 
e-commerce platforms 
Figure 2.  The impact of  on the value of value- 
added services 
 
 
6.2 Influence of   on the overall profit of supply chain 
When 2 p , with the increase of the value-added service level coefficient, the overall profit of the 
supply chain is also increasing. This shows that when the consumer's shopping demand is significantly affected 
by the value-added service level of the e-commerce platform products, improving the value-added service level 
can improve the overall profit of supply chain, but the increase in value-added service levels means that 
products that require e-commerce platforms will bring greater value-added service costs, which will lead to a 
decline in the profit of the supply chain, and even a state of loss, as shown in Figure 3.For the decentralized 
supply chain overall profit level difference, within a certain interval, as the value of   increases, the 
difference gradually increases, but when 2 f , the overall profit level of the supply chain will have a 
negative value. For the overall profit of the centralized decision-making supply chain, the presence or absence 
of value-added services is not much different from the overall profit of the supply chain, as shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3． The impact of  on the overall profit 
 of the supply chain 
Figure 4.  Effect of the presence or absence of   on 
the overall profit margin of the supply chain 
 
7.SUMMARY 
Providing value-added services to products is an important means for enterprises to achieve differentiated 
competition. In the increasingly fierce market competition, differentiated value-added services play an 
increasingly important role in the product sales process. By studying the pricing strategies of centralized 
decision-making supply chain and decentralized decision-making supply chain, the relevant conclusions are as 
follows:(1) There is a critical value for the centralized decision-making supply chain and the decentralized 
decision-making supply chain optimal pricing decision. When  p , At this time, the centralized 
decision-making supply chain pricing strategy is better; when  f , At this time, the decentralized 
decision-making supply chain pricing strategy is better.(2)The existence of value-added service level, the overall 
pricing difference of the centralized decision-making supply chain influence is less than the overall pricing 
difference of the decentralized decision-making supply chain.(3) When 2 p , the overall profit of the 
centralized decision-making supply chain and the decentralized decision-making supply chain is on the rise. 
When 2 f , the overall profit of the centralized decision-making supply chain and the decentralized 
decision-making supply chain will plummet. There are even cases of negative values. In the establishment of the 
consumer demand function, this paper assumes that there is a clear linear relationship between demand and price 
and value-added service level. However, in real life, there are many uncertainties, so in the next research, we 
will consider supplying in an uncertain environment chain synergy. 
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